Over the past five years, the Supreme Audit Office has examined the digitalisation of public administration in 51 audits, representing more than one quarter of all audit reports completed during that period. The strong representation of this topic reflects the level of importance we attach to it.

The period 2020–2025 was intended to serve as a key milestone in the digitalisation of government services. Under the Act on the Right to Digital Services, most registered agenda services were to become fully digital from February 2025. Beyond the formal wording of the Act, this represented a clear commitment by the State to its citizens: from that date onwards, most administrative matters were to be handled online, without the need for in-person visits or the repeated submission of documents already held by public authorities. This commitment has not been fulfilled. What was the actual situation? As at the end of January 2025, only 18% of services were fully digitalised.

What lies behind this? In our audit reports, we identified a range of causes, including the fragmented nature of the State’s digitalisation agenda, the absence of consistent and strong leadership, poor value for money, the State’s inability to attract and retain skilled labour, as well as the repeated postponement of deadlines and the lowering of expected standards. At the same time, Czech citizens demonstrate readiness for digital services. In comparison with 2023, the Czech Republic has improved by 10% in digital literacy. According to the DESI index, more than 69% of the population possesses at least basic digital skills, significantly exceeding the EU average of 55.6%.

However, audit evidence indicates that the principal barrier to successful digital transformation lies in the insufficient understanding of user needs — including those of citizens as well as government employees — combined with a failure to treat digitalisation as an opportunity to fundamentally redesign established processes and working methods.

In practice, digitalisation in the Czech Republic is most frequently limited to the introduction of electronic forms, without prior evaluation of the necessity and efficiency of individual procedural steps within the relevant agenda. As a result, although online interfaces are introduced through public portals, internal administrative processes often continue to operate manually and without the much needed improvements. Consequently, digitalisation fails to deliver the expected improvements in user convenience, processing speed, or financial savings.

Several examples illustrate these shortcomings. Within the eJustice strategy, the Ministry of Justice fulfilled only two of twenty defined objectives. In the case of eCollection, users cannot reliably depend on the timeliness of published legislation. The launch of eLegislation has been postponed until the end of 2027, despite development activities having commenced as early as 2017.

When the Czech Social Security Administration digitalised its agenda, a key part of the pensions agenda remained in paper form because it was limited by an outdated information system. The lack of internal digitalisation of the agenda not only delays the processing of pensions and makes the work of government employees more difficult, but also burdens applicants with requests for documents and information already provided to the State.

The Ministry of Finance began preparations for a new information system for the supervision of gambling in 2014. Six years later, development was terminated. Only two of the three planned modules had been completed, while the allocated funds had been fully expended. And I could go on and on, just read the present report.

The significant financial resources consumed by digitalisation, despite limited tangible results, explain the sustained and intensive focus of the Supreme Audit Office on this area. This focus will continue. An equally important issue is public trust. Citizens reasonably expect that substantial public investment will result in a flexible, user-oriented and efficient public administration. Trust in digital public services forms an integral component of trust in public institutions. This trust cannot be taken for granted.

Miloslav Kala,
President of the Supreme Audit Office

DIGITALISATION IN THE CZECH REPUBLIC: DESPITE BILLIONS SPENT, THE FULFILMENT OF CITIZENS’ RIGHT TO DIGITAL SERVICES HAS BEEN DELAYED BY TWO YEARS

The Czech Republic invested more than CZK 50 billion in projects to develop the digitalisation of public administration in 2020-2024. However, the fundamental goal of completing full digitalisation of services was not achieved by the date set by Act No 12/2020 Coll., on the Right to Digital Services (February 2025¹). The ambition was to fundamentally transform communication with citizens by making the majority of public administration agenda services (“agenda services“ means public administrative services grouped into thematic clusters) fully accessible online through self-service digital channels within a five-year timeframe.

The SAO conducted an analysis of data from the Catalogue of Public Administration Services , which showed a discrepancy between how services were reported in the catalogue and their actual level of digitalisation. Out of a total of 8,916 services suitable for digitalisation, only 1,621 services were accessible to public administration clients through self-service channels.² Only 18% of services were fully online. Most services remain at the level of an electronic form, the submission of which merely initiates the administrative process, but further steps within the office are carried out manually without any interconnection with internal systems.

Even a service in which only a single step has been digitalised is currently labelled as digitalised. This approach significantly distorts the true extent of digitalisation. Such a service may be registered as digital although most of its operations are still manual. Indeed, a digital interface often does not mean a fully digital process. Many services are still handled manually using data mailboxes, without connection to the relevant agenda information system. If digitalisation does not also cover service processes within the agenda, we cannot talk about efficient digitalisation of public administration.

By February 2025, most of the State’s agenda services should have been available digitally. What was the actual situation? Only 18% of services were fully digital.

Although key laws and strategies were adopted within the Digital Czechia programme for the digitalisation of public administration services and a new institution, the Digital and Information Agency (DIA), was established, the State has not fulfilled some of its statutory obligations through the authorities responsible for individual agendas.³

The DIA’s task is, among other things, to coordinate projects, unify the procedures of the ministries and set up the digital architecture of the State. However, the DIA does not have sufficient powers to enforce uniform solutions and efficiently manage the development of digitalisation of public administration. Ministries, central administrative authorities and other public authorities continue to develop parallel information systems and use subsidies to further fragment digital infrastructure at higher costs.

The DIA does coordinate digitalisation, but without real influence on eGovernment IT project budgets it cannot enforce uniform solutions or ensure effective capacity planning of shared services to eliminate digital service outages.

SAO audits repeatedly show that the results often do not correspond to the investments made. A number of key eGovernment projects did not meet the set objectives in the past period and their debt to the clients of public administration, but also to the government employees themselves, is carried into the next years – e.g., the integration of the electronic records management across the Ministry of Justice with new functions; the long-delayed renewal of the infrastructure of the basic registries; repeated postponements of the launch of electronic lawmaking in connection with unfulfilled expectations in the eCeL (eCollection and eLegislation) project; only partial digitalisation in the health sector, where, for example, progress in sharing health documentation between health service providers or electronic requests for medical procedures (eRequest) will be made in 2026 instead of the originally planned 2020.

Despite a number of challenges, significant achievements were made in the years 2020-2024. One of them is the introduction of the Banking Identity in 2021. Thanks to the cooperation between the State and banking institutions⁴, millions of citizens can easily and securely log in to the State’s online services. The number of Banking Identity users is growing. Citizens have also seen innovations such as the possibility to apply for a driver’s licence⁵ online; the licence can also be collected at a self-service box, which is a concrete example of practical digitalisation simplifying the everyday life of citizens.

Other positive examples include the CR’s participation in the Single Digital Gateway⁶, which enables not only Czech citizens but also companies to handle administrative matters online across EU Member States. In addition, the DIA successfully launched the Register of Powers of Attorney in July 2024; it has become part of the Register of Rights and Obligations . Its contribution is conditional on the active approach of the authorities responsible for the relevant agendas⁷, who have to process and publish the power of attorney templates.

A positive trend is the shift in international rankings. The State of the Digital Decade 2025 report assesses the progress of the European Union and its Member States in the digital transformation. The Czech Republic improved in the DESI index for 2024 and is currently among the countries with an above-average score in the EU. Improvements are also evident in the area of digital literacy, where the Czech Republic has improved by 10% compared to 2023. According to the DESI, more than 69% of people have basic digital skills, well above the EU average (55.6%). The Czech Republic ranked 13th out of 27 in the use of digital public services by private individuals and 14th in the use of these services by entrepreneurs. These are therefore rankings close to the European average. We are also above the EU average in the number of eGovernment users (78.5%). According to the DESI index, we also achieved a significant year-on-year improvement of 26.3% in access to electronic health records, which finally brings us closer to the EU standard. On the other hand, the Czech Republic continues to rank at the bottom of the European ranking in terms of online pre-filled forms (44%). This confirms that the problem does not lie with the users, i.e., clients of public administration, but rather in the way the State designs, coordinates and delivers digital services.

Citizens are ready, the State is not.

The potential of the State’s digital transformation is not being fully exploited.

Despite tens of billions invested in digitalisation, the Czech Republic still lags behind digital leaders such as Denmark and Estonia. These countries have managed to build an integrated and user-friendly eGovernment that allows citizens to handle most of their life situations online from the comfort of their home or work. Public administration services in these countries with successful digital transformation have moved towards a proactive approach. The individual agendas transmit the necessary data to each other automatically, and eGovernment itself thus offers citizens the option to handle official matters related to their current life situations. For example, citizens are automatically informed and invited by the relevant agenda service to apply for a maternity or parental leave allowance.⁸

In Czech practice, digitalisation is most often limited to the digitalisation of application forms, but without the necessary internal optimisation of processes. As a result, while online services are being made available through portal solutions, the actual agendas are still handled by government employees largely manually using “digitalised paperwork”. This leads to overloading, and digitalisation brings neither the expected savings nor speed-up. The current state of affairs, despite some partial improvements, shows that the introduction of truly proactive eGovernment services in the Czech Republic cannot be expected before 2030.

The state administration is thus at a crossroads of digitalisation. If it is to meet citizens’ expectations and deliver on its commitments under the EU’s Digital Decade 2030 policy agenda, it will need to link the management and coordination of the digitalisation of public administration with clear accountability for achieving digital transformation objectives and for the funds expended. After more than two years of operation of the DIA, it should be noted that the Ministry of the Interior (MoI) continues to play a coordinating role in the organisation and performance of public administration.⁹ The close interaction of these two organisational units of the State is thus a necessary condition for the efficient management of the digital transformation of the state administration, which also involves the coordination of artificial intelligence at the level of the Government Commissioner¹⁰ under the Ministry of Industry and Trade (MoIT).

Catalogue of Public Administration Services – a digital gateway that remains incomprehensible to citizens.

Although many services that can be handled online were added in 2024, the basic navigation of the digital environment often remains complex and difficult for the average user. One of the tools designed to facilitate this navigation and contribute to greater transparency of digital services is the Catalogue of Public Administration Services . The ordinary citizen can encounter it, for example, when navigating through life situations on the Public Administration Portal .¹¹ The Catalogue is a central database that records information about the State’s agendas and, among other things, the availability of digital channels.

The issue of the Catalogue of Services reveals a deeper structural problem, that is, lack of readiness of internal digitalisation. Although at first glance the Catalogue may give the impression that most public administration services are digitalised, in reality it only records partial digitalisation (e.g., using the data mailbox channel), without full electronic processing corresponding to the implementation of an end-to-end digitalised process. The Catalogue of Services, which was supposed to be a clear gateway to digital services, currently reflects the fragmentation of Czech eGovernment.

The status of the reported service can be viewed in detail in the INTERACTIVE ANNEX to the present Comprehensive Report.

The Ministry of Agriculture, the Czech National Bank and the Ministry of Finance (MoF) register the largest number of services suitable for digitalisation. Together, these three institutions cover 36% of total services. As already mentioned, the Catalogue also includes services that are only partially digitalised. If we focus only on the services available through a self-service portal, the Ministry of Finance clearly dominates in the number of digitalised services. The Ministry allows the processing of its agendas exclusively online, especially in the area of taxes and business reporting.

The institution of disproportionate burden, which allows, in justified cases, to exclude from digitalisation those services where digitalisation would impose a disproportionate burden on public authorities, also indicates certain limits in the development of digitalisation. At the same time, each competent authority is individually responsible for the accuracy, completeness and timeliness of the information about its services in the Catalogue of Services. Only that authority can see whether all the services it provides are actually recorded in the system. Although the DIA, which has also published a methodology for the aforesaid institution, is the main coordinator, its competence to verify the accuracy or completeness of the entered information about the agenda is limited.

MAIN BARRIERS TO DIGITAL TRANSFORMATION OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

The functioning of public administration is nowadays dependent on the continuous operation of the digital eGovernment infrastructure, in particular on the system of basic registries and shared services that ensure the exchange of data between Public Administration Information Systems. The state administration is thus a key carrier of digital transformation within the public administration.

The SAO identified the main barriers¹² which, in terms of their focus, touched on areas related to the results of audits in the field of ICT. The individual barriers can be viewed in detail in the INTERACTIVE ANNEX to the present Comprehensive Report.

Figure 1: Overview of the main barriers to successful digital transformation of public administration

Source: prepared by the SAO on the basis of 51 audit reports.

In the period under review, the SAO not only carried out audits focused on eGovernment as a priority, but also focused its attention on other areas of expenditure related to ICT projects, along with other projects to modernise (streamline) public administration services. Of these 51 audits, the selected audit findings were classified according to the type of shortcoming and assigned to one of seven main barriers.

The barrier (B1) “Non-achievement of project objectives and low economic efficiency” is associated with the highest number of audit findings, namely 87. The second place is taken up by the barriers (B6) “Incomplete data with complex data flows” and (B3) “Legal, contractual and procedural constraints”, with which the SAO associated 59 audit findings in each barrier. These are followed by the barriers (B4) “Inadequate project management” and (B2) “Strategic and conceptual shortcomings”, with more than 30 audit findings for each of these two barriers. The barriers (B5) “Costly operational solutions” and (B7) “Shortage of expert human resources” follow with a much lower number of audit findings, but this does not diminish their weight given their cross-cutting nature.

The following sections of this Comprehensive Report explain the main barriers in more detail and illustrate the nature of the weaknesses with selected examples from the audits. Further examples are given in the interactive annex, distinguished by individual barriers. The aim of this section is to show, among other things, how systemic, procedural or technical shortcomings combined with delays in project completion undermine the benefits of digital services for citizens and other public administration clients. For the public administration itself and the government employees in charge of the relevant agendas, these shortcomings usually mean an increase in the administrative burden, which in turn has a negative impact on the expenditure side of the state budget.

(B1) NON-ACHIEVEMENT OF PROJECT OBJECTIVES AND LOW ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY

The barrier manifests itself mainly in the poor results of projects, which, despite significant investments, often fail to meet the set objectives and expectations.

Through audit operations focused on performance¹³, over the last five years the SAO has produced specific findings on eGovernment projects and other activities aimed at modernising public administration services. The results of the audits show that a number of projects have not met their originally set objectives and are not delivering the expected benefits in relation to the significant amount of funds spent.

Moreover, project objectives are formulated too generally, often merely as “ creating conditions ” or “ fulfilling preconditions ”. Achieving real qualitative change often has no links to clearly measurable outcome indicators. As a result, the real benefits of the projects cannot be reliably verified either by their implementers or by the funders. This shortcoming is often justified by the fact that the impacts of the projects are outside the direct influence of the project team. At the same time, it turns out that the chosen solutions achieve the defined functionalities only at the technical level of digitalisation, but there are no benefits in the form of increased quality of public administration services.

Subsidies spent as early as the initial stages of IT projects for the acquisition of HW often lead to a situation where newly built information systems are put into operation at a time when the warranty for the HW and SW platform has already expired. The deployment of information systems into the production environment is also usually accompanied by an accelerated need for further adjustments to respond to the needs of users operating services in a given agenda. However, these adjustments tend to be paid for in addition to the original contract, as they are labelled as “information system development”. The common denominator of unsuccessful eGovernment projects is the underestimation of business analysis ¹⁴, which is supposed to evaluate existing processes and propose their optimisation for digitalisation (for more details see subsection B3).

The eJustice Strategy is a typical example of failure to meet the set objectives. Of the total of 20 specified objectives, the Ministry of Justice (MoJ) has only managed to meet two.¹⁵ Moreover, many of these activities were not followed up by other necessary steps, thus reducing their contribution. Specifically, the eISIR project (examined in Audit No 21/28), the implementation of which was to contribute significantly to the digitalisation at the MoJ from 2020 onwards, had to be modified in such a way that the IROP Managing Authority withdrew almost one-half of the originally allocated funds, as the MoJ had failed to achieve its original objectives within the set deadlines.

The eISIR project, financed under the IROP, reduced eligible expenditure by CZK 23.9 million to CZK 196 million, of which only CZK 103.5 million had been paid out by 31 December 2023. Despite the original completion date (end of 2020), the project continues with additional costs covered only by the state budget.

The eISIR project (funded under the IROP), which is key to the digitalisation of the judiciary and the object of which is the creation of an agenda IS of the Insolvency Register (eISIR), an electronic records management system (eRecords) and a justice centre, still has not been completed. The original completion date was set for 31 December 2020, with the project start date on 1 October 2017. The total project expenditure was increased from CZK 219.9 million to CZK 242.8 million, of which eligible expenditure was reduced from CZK 219.9 million to CZK 196 million; ineligible expenditure thus amounted to CZK 46.8 million.

The project was classified as a non-working project and its implementation was extended until 31 October 2026 (i.e., beyond the programming period; this is also the latest deadline for the completion of these projects). Until November 2025, the MoJ had been reimbursed CZK 103.5 million under the project; CZK 83.7 million was paid from the European Regional Development Fund through the IROP. All expenditure incurred in the project after 31 December 2023 must be covered by the MoJ from the resources of the state budget chapter 336 – Ministry of Justice and the completion of the project was extended again by one year, i.e., until October 2026, with the consent of the Managing Authority.

It is worth recalling that the MoJ has been striving to improve the quality of the justice system since the first programming period, for which the Strategy for the Implementation of Smart Administration in the period of 2007-2015 was crucial. The specific objective of digitalisation of the judiciary was not achieved to the planned extent and further activities were subsequently focused on expanding administrative capacity and the digitalisation and modernisation of internal processes. Despite partial progress in some areas¹⁶, the low level of digitalisation in the justice department necessitated a re-setting of digitalisation objectives. Within the updated documentation of Programme No 036 02 – Development and renewal of the material and technical base of the judiciary from 2021 ¹⁷, the MoJ set the objective of “creating the prerequisites for a digital justice system and digital services for citizens and companies”, along with the objective of “acquisition and renewal of ICT”. For example, the projects relating to the “prerequisites for electronic records and fully electronic filing” correspond to these objectives. The defined low ambitions of the MoJ in the area of eGovernment-enabled public administration services point to a very unsatisfactory state of eJustice, including outdated internal processes, in the long term.

The setting of Programme No 036 02 in the part of the sub-programme focused on ICT shows that the MoJ is currently focusing on the regular renewal of ICT infrastructure rather than on meeting the specific objectives of digital justice and the development of services for the public. By the end of the programming period of 2021-2027, expectations related to the development of digital justice may not be fulfilled at all or may be fulfilled only partially, which will not, however, bring substantial savings of financial resources related to the reduction of the administrative burden of courts. Without functional remote access to court files, all documents necessary in judicial proceedings will not be shared.

The Ministry of Justice will continue to face similar shortcomings (probably until 2030) that it faced already at the time of the implementation of the Smart Administration Strategy and subsequently the Strategic Framework for the Development of Public Administration in the Czech Republic for the period of 2014-2020 . Thus far, what has been spent from EU funds on eJustice has not brought the expected benefits in the form of increased efficiency of justice institutions and reduced administrative burden on their staff.

Similar shortcomings were also identified by the SAO in Audit No 22/20, which focused on the implementation of the National eHealth Strategy of the CR 2016-2020 . Among other things, the Ministry of Health (MoH) did not set up an infrastructure for sharing health data between health service providers by the statutory deadline. Strategic Objectives No 2 Increasing the efficiency of the health system and No 4 eHealth infrastructure and administration were not met, as communication between these providers, including the establishment of a secure infrastructure, was not set up. Efforts to fulfil these objectives moved into projects that had received financial support under the National Recovery Plan . Although the Institute of Health Information and Statistics (IHIS) did meet the changed objectives of the project, no system for a nationwide secure sharing of health data was created. The provisions of Act No 325/2021 Coll., on the Digitalisation of the Health Sector, and the objectives set out in the National eHealth Strategy of the CR 2016-2020 were not fulfilled.

Although the MoH spent CZK 158 million on the strategic objectives of eHealth, as of 1 January 2023 it had not established any master health registers, trust services, central eHealth services or an activity log as required by law.

The Ministry of the Interior was to set up an information system for the creation and issuing of legal regulations in the CR electronically as part of the eCeL project over three years (between 2017 and 2020). The MoI extended the period of implementation of the eCeL project from the originally planned three years to nine years and almost doubled the project budget to CZK 903 million. By December 2024, the MoI had submitted a total of 22 project change requests, including repeated requests for extensions of the completion deadline and budget increases. The Ministry of Regional Development, as the Managing Authority of the European funds, approved all these requests.

The eCollection project was launched with a four-year delay, while the full implementation of eLegislation has been delayed until 2027, almost a decade after its launch, due to repeated postponements.

The MoI put eCollection into live operation with a four-year delay in January 2024. Before then, the Collection of Laws and the Collection of International Treaties had been published in printed form. The second part of the system, called eLegislation, through which legislation is to be produced in digital form, is formally completed, but the existence of a significant number of shortcomings has led to the postponement of the use of eLegislation until January 2026. In November 2025, the MoI submitted a draft amendment to the Collection of Laws Act, which would postpone the full introduction of eLegislation again for another year, until 15 January 2027. If the amendment is adopted by the Parliament of the CR, it will be the sixth amendment to the law postponing the complete introduction of eLegislation. At the same time, the period of implementation of eLegislation would also be extended to almost a full decade (since the start of the project in early 2017).

Without a functioning eLegislation, the MoI has to digitalise and then verify new laws, which is done through contractors. There is also a significant time lag between the promulgation of new legislation and its publication in the consolidated version in eCollection. In 2023, the MoI spent CZK 23.5 million on the necessary digitalisation and verification. That was CZK 13.5 million more than it had paid for the publication of the paper “Collection of Laws”. The Ministry of the Interior will spend funds on digitalisation and verification until the full launch of eLegislation and admits that these expenditures depend, among other things, on the legislative activity of the Parliament of the CR.

The State invests significant funds in digital projects, but these often emerge in a different form than originally planned, or start to fulfil their purpose after a significant delay, i.e., at a time when they should have already brought the expected benefits. Subsidy providers (Managing Authorities of operational programmes) are often satisfied with only partial fulfilment of the set objectives. The assessment of substantial changes to projects submitted on an ongoing basis is carried out without an analysis of their actual impact on the project and its expected benefits. These shortcomings burdened eGovernment projects co-financed under operational programmes in the 2014+ programming period as well as under the National Recovery Plan . The redefinition of objectives or key activities approved by the Managing Authority during implementation effectively confirms the legality of the non-fulfilment of the original project objectives. At the same time, however, it allows a significant part of the allocated funds to be used up and formally declared to have fulfilled the purpose of the subsidy, without actually achieving the originally intended and later changed benefits.

In its audit report in the spring of 2025, the ECA stressed that, without strategic management and alignment with the objectives of the Digital Decade 2030, Europe’s largest instrument (the RRF) for digital transformation remained a missed opportunity.

As the RRF is the largest European financial mechanism supporting digital transformation objectives in EU Member States, the European Court of Auditors (ECA) audited its functioning over the period from its launch until March 2024. Although the Czech Republic was not included in the sample of Member States that were directly audited for digital transformation measures in their National Recovery Plans, the results published in Special Report No 13/2025 show that the identified shortcomings are systemic in nature and are associated with limited opportunities to assess the actual results and benefits of the implemented digital transformation measures.¹⁸

The ECA audit report, with a sub-title A missed opportunity for strategic focus in addressing digital needs , also notes that the indicators monitored focused mainly on outputs rather than results. They were not sufficiently linked to relevant strategic objectives, such as those of the EU’s Digital Decade 2030 policy agenda, which are based on the DESI methodology. According to the ECA, the European Commission’s legislative proposal is to ensure, in future financing instruments, a more effective focus of financing to address the key digital needs identified in the EU Digital Strategy.

The fact that the current process of digitalisation of the state administration complicates the work of government employees rather than actually helping them in the performance of the services provided is also evidenced by the results of Audit No 24/32. That audit operation focused, among other things, on the examination of the defined objectives of the Labour Office of the Czech Republic (LO CR) aimed at streamlining its own management and improving the quality of services provided by the LO CR. A positive example of the modernisation of public administration is the JENDA portal, which has made a significant contribution to the digitalisation of the state social assistance benefits agenda. Digitalisation of agendas has increased the comfort of one-third of the LO CR clients, but it has not yet contributed to speeding up the work of the LO CR employees. Unfortunately, the anticipated intensified assistance to people at risk on the labour market has not taken place either. Instead, the LO CR staff had to deal more frequently with errors in clients’ online applications or test new versions of digital tools. Even 14 years after its establishment, the LO CR had not set up uniform workflows at its branches, which, together with its decentralised organisational structure, had a negative impact on the management of the institution.

The overall average time for processing applications for state social assistance benefits was reduced by the LO CR in 2023 and 2024 but, according to the SAO’s findings, this was not thanks to the digitalisation of selected LO CR agendas, but primarily thanks to changes in the management of the organisation. Paradoxically, in 2024 the average time between the receipt of applications for state social support benefits and the issuance of a decision by the LO CR was longer for online submissions than for applications submitted in person at the LO CR. The current digitalisation of selected types of non-insurance social benefits has not yet led to acceleration of the work of the LO CR employees.

The fact that we are still not among the top performers in international comparison is also evidenced by the ENPES studies analysed by the SAO as part of its audit. In comparison with other EU countries, the LO CR belonged in the group of ten least developed institutions providing public employment services in the audited period, or at least until 2023. For the sake of comparison: The possibility of submitting an online application for job placement and application for unemployment benefits was introduced at the LO CR as of 1 January 2025. In the first quarter of 2025, approximately 35% of the LO CR clients used this option. By contrast, in Sweden, 93% of job placement applications were already handled online five years before that (in the first quarter of 2020), according to ENPES data.

Unfinished digitalisation does not help; on the contrary, it keeps clients and government employees busy. The ECA’s audit recommendations to the European Commission include ensuring that the final milestones and targets for measures cover the full scope of the digital transformation.

(B2) STRATEGIC AND CONCEPTUAL SHORTCOMINGS

The barrier includes, in particular, the lack of vision, strategy, planning and management of digitalisation.

The results of the SAO’s audits show that, despite the large number of existing strategic and conceptual documents for digital transformation¹⁹, the state administration still lacks a coordinated approach with clear responsibilities of individual actors involved in the strategic management of the whole transformation. Ad hoc decisions which are based neither on a systematic analysis of the needs of public administration clients, nor on the needs of staff on the side of the executors of the agendas, prevail. The development and renewal of Public Administration Information Systems often deviates from the principles of long-term ICT development management.

The quality of ministerial strategic documents for the ICT sector was so low that ICT development and related investments worth hundreds of millions of CZK could not be managed according to those documents.

In the Audit Report on Audit No 19/14 focused on the introduction of electronic identification and access to digital public administration services, which the SAO completed in 2020, the auditors pointed out the clear benefit of pre-filled forms for citizens in the context of the implementation of the “only once” principle on the then newly launched Citizen’s Portal. However, progress in this area has been so slow over the past five years that the Czech Republic remains at the “tail” of the DESI ranking in international comparison. The state administration preferred to use the data mailbox information system for sending forms, thus confirming the risk of non-compliance with the requirements of the Act on the Right to Digital Services, which the SAO repeatedly pointed out in its annual reports in the past years after the adoption of that Act. In the digitalisation schedule, the central administrative authorities postponed the introduction of self-service digital channels until the end of 2024.

The SAO also noted situations where one office within the ministry in question relied on another. Audit No 20/01 found that the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (MoLSA), which is responsible for elaborating the concept of development of the sector entrusted to it and addressing key issues, had stated in the framework of the ongoing audit that conceptual or strategic materials to cover the administration of social security contributions had been prepared by the Czech Social Security Administration (CSSA). On the other hand, the CSSA stated that the development of a long-term concept and strategy for securing the collection and administration of social security contributions should be primarily the responsibility of the MoLSA.

Information strategies describe the ICT sector from the perspective of both the current state of affairs and the desired future development. According to the law, organisational units of the State were required to have their own information strategies in place as of 2009. The SAO found that strategic documents had been absent for several years, resulting in uncertainty regarding the direction of eGovernment development.

In Audit No 23/05, the SAO found that the MoI had not had an approved Information Concept until 2 March 2023. Neither the Ministry of the Interior nor the Basic Registries Authority had incorporated the strategic concept of the development of basic registries (BR 2.0 Concept) into their approved Information Concepts. The SAO found, among other things, that the MoI had not incorporated the needs, objectives and other aspects based on the BR 2.0 Concept into any of the produced versions of its Information Concept, although from both the material and financial point of view the fulfilment of the BR 2.0 Concept was a key prerequisite for an efficient digitalisation of public administration.

These and other cases identified by the SAO under this barrier (see INTERACTIVE ANNEX) illustrate a broader problem: The lack of long-term ICT planning and the superiority of providers/contractors in terms of knowledge may lead to the state administration not being able to achieve a more cost-effective solution within the lifecycle of robust information systems.

(B3) LEGAL, CONTRACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL CONSTRAINTS

This barrier includes, inter alia, practices in breach of the applicable legislation and shortcomings in terms of the readiness of digitally friendly legislation.

As regards legal, contractual and procedural constraints, the audit operations found shortcomings, in particular, in the unresolved legislative conditions (digital friendliness) affecting procedural complexity, which increases the administrative burden, and, last but not least, in contractual arrangements. The cooperation between the contractor and the client does not reflect the risks that are specific to a given agenda, and the client (central administrative authority) does not have the option to transfer these risks to the contractor to a reasonable extent.

Some eGovernment projects have been launched without clear lines of authority, accountability and enforceability of interaction between the entities involved. The legal framework cannot effectively compensate for the shortcomings in the methodological and contractual set-up of the procedure, which in some cases did not correspond to actual practice or to the staff resources dedicated to the project by the contracting parties. The contractual terms and conditions were often so vague that they did not allow the contractor to be penalised even for shortcomings detected in time during the project.

In Audit No 23/25, the SAO pointed out inadequate processes and incomplete internal digitalisation of the Labour Office of the CR and the Czech Social Security Administration. For example, in the pensions agenda, processes were subordinated to the limits of the information system instead of the IS supporting optimised settings of the agenda services. A part of the pensions agenda continues to be processed in paper form. The lack of internal digitalisation, resulting from processes adapted to an outdated information system, prolongs processing times and requires government employees to repeatedly request information from citizens that is already held by the public administration.

The MoF was preparing a new information system for supervision over gambling, starting in 2014. Contracts with providers were concluded in 2018 and 2019, respectively. According to them, the AISG was to be fully operational starting from May 2020. The MoF subsequently concluded amendments to the contracts, which changed the price, narrowed the scope and extended the delivery date. In August 2020, the MoF terminated the development of the AISG in a state where only two of its three modules were fully operational, while funds had been spent on building all of them.

As a result of the non-completion of the AISG, its administrative module supported only three out of the planned twelve processes. The MoF thus had to maintain in operation the previous (non-compliant) IS, which had been created for the needs of the then valid Act No 202/1990 Coll., on Lotteries and Other Similar Games, although that IS had been intended to be fully replaced by the new AISG.

In response to the Audit Report on Audit No 22/31, the MoF has taken corrective measures in the area of information support and the provision of complete and reliable data. In its corrective measure, it is planning to complete the AISG administrative module by December 2026.

Instead of analysing the agenda processes and optimising them, which would result in meaningful and efficient digitalisation, citizens are still faced with complex forms and government employees with unnecessary steps.

Over two decades of efforts to modernise public administration should have been completed in the programming period of 2014-2020. The MoI has set itself the task of describing, mapping and optimising processes at individual offices.²⁰ The situation where identical agendas are still carried out at individual offices using different official procedures complicates the digitalisation of these agendas and, as a result, makes it more difficult for citizens to deal with life situations in contact with the authorities concerned.

The audit of the PMA 3 project, implemented by the MoI between 2017 and 2023²¹, found, among other things, that of the 56 proposed measures to simplify citizens’ contact with the authorities, only four had been put into practice. The reason for the low implementation was the lack of interest of the authorities concerned in adopting the solutions proposed by the Ministry of the Interior. The desired optimisation of processes of selected agendas, which could then be efficiently digitalised, did not take place. In the course of the PMA 3 project, the MoI gave up optimising entire agendas. Instead of simplifying them, the focus was on dealing with the life situations of citizens when they contacted the authorities. For example, the MoI was creating instructions on how a citizen should proceed when dealing with a life situation. However, these only described the current state.

The MoI team had been working on the implementation of a payment gateway in the PMA 3 project since 2018, but no single payment gateway could be implemented by 2023 and public administration clients still did not have the option of online payment of administrative fees. The payment of administrative fees applies to the handling of a number of life situations. In this context, the MoI stressed the importance of a central payment gateway for public administration. The payment gateway was supposed to allow citizens to pay administrative fees simply by online payment instead of stamps. The payment of administrative fees by conventional stamps was allowed until the end of 2024.²²

Legislative processes in the Czech Republic do not respect the principles of digitally friendly legislation, as is common in other EU countries.

This example illustrates the extremely slow pace of the drafting of digitally friendly legislation in the Czech Republic. Unlike the Czech Republic, public administration clients in Slovakia have been able to pay administrative fees with electronic stamps (eStamp) via shopping kiosks, as well as a mobile and web application, since April 2014. The Government of the CR adopted Resolution No 379 of 28 May 2025 on making all payments to the public administration by means of payment cards or cashless payment . In it, it instructed members of the Government and heads of other central state administration authorities to implement measures to enable the making of all payments to the public administration by payment cards or cashless payment by the end of August 2025.

A policy for the creation of digitally friendly legislation was submitted to the Government as early as 2017, but was discussed without the adoption of any resolution. The policy mentions, among other things, the basic principles of digitalisation (e.g., digital by default, only once , IS consolidation, shared services), but does not regulate specific procedures for the preparation and evaluation of legislative proposals. This shortcoming is not effectively compensated by the system of Regulatory Impact Assessment (RIA), which is based on the general principles for Regulatory Impact Assessment (ex ante RIA, ex post RIA) and, in proposals for legislative variants of solutions, analyses, inter alia, the necessary information for the administration of the solutions and optimisation of obtaining such information, including an assessment of whether it is possible to use information and communication technology for obtaining and handling such information.

Inspiration for the introduction of a system that verifies the readiness for a digital environment when drafting legislation can be found, for example, in the neighbouring Federal Republic of Germany, where the Digitalcheck service is used to examine proposals as part of the legislative process. In Denmark, verification of pending legislation is being carried out according to the principles of digital-ready legislation and is the responsibility of the Danish Agency for Digital Government.

(B4) INADEQUATE PROJECT MANAGEMENT

The barrier affects the implementation of projects.

Underestimation of IT project lifecycle management is one of the key barriers to digital transformation. Central administrative authorities often do not ensure that a project is properly managed from the beginning of its lifecycle. These are shortcomings that can be identified already at the planning stage. Tender documentation is often insufficiently elaborate and not based on a business analysis to define the current state and optimal process setup for the required functionalities. These are then specified vaguely, without a specific link to the processes of the agenda in question, and are seemingly compensated by a contractually covered “agile approach” on the part of the contractor.

However, the principles of the agile approach also place extraordinary demands on the client’s team and, once implementation begins, shortcomings in the form of weak management, deadline extensions and poor quality control of project deliverables usually emerge.

The audits revealed, among other things, cases where key decisions often lacked follow-up to previous analytical evidence. It has also been repeatedly shown that the time constraints that projects run into during the tender procedure lead to insufficient testing of the delivered IT solution, which leads to the acceptance of a solution with reservations and subsequent elimination of serious shortcomings only after deployment in the production environment.

Similar problems were noted in Audit No 22/01 concerning the development of an information system for the administration of motorway charges (electronic vignettes). After the launch of the EV IS, serious functional shortcomings were registered for several months, such as confusion of characters when entering data and the possibility of purchasing an electronic vignette for a non-existent registration plate or for vehicles not covered by the charging scheme. As a result of these errors, the service provider had to repeatedly change its terms and conditions. The system was accepted only after 570 days of operation, with 226 reservations.

According to the findings in Audit No 24/04, the Electronic Collection of Laws and International Treaties (eCollection) and Electronic Legislation (eLegislation) (eCeL) project has become another example of failure in the management of a large-scale IT project. The implementation time has been extended from three to nine years compared to the plan and the cost has almost doubled. Moreover, the state of the project in the eLegislation part creates the need for further investments in the order of tens of millions and the application and HW platforms are proving to be outdated, even though they are not yet in full use. On the positive side, the MoI, based on the SAO’s audit finding, introduced a disclaimer in eCollection, informing users that the relevant legislation has been amended, in November 2025.

According to the MoI, the reasons for the complicated implementation of eLegislation lay on the side of the partner institutions, which, according to the MoI’s opinion, did not have sufficient capacity or were burdened with other activities, and at the same time continuously added requirements for new functionalities of the eLegislation system during the implementation. However, the SAO noted that the audited documents showed the opposite, as the partner institutions had pointed to insufficient cooperation and provision of information by the MoI. This view was confirmed by the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the Chamber of Deputies in their joint letter of 29 September 2025 to the Minister of the Interior.

Beneficiaries of subsidies under eGovernment projects submitted changes to projects for consideration by the IROP Managing Authority usually as partial modifications. It was only in the overall view of these requests, which had been granted by the Managing Authority, that it became clear how the project had departed substantially from its original intentions.

The possibility to extend the implementation of the eCeL project beyond 31 December 2023 results from the fact that the project has been granted the status of a “non-working project” by the IROP Managing Authority, i.e., the physical implementation of the project will not be completed before 14 November 2025. The IROP Managing Authority has made this procedure possible on the basis of Regulation (EU) 2021/1060 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2021, as amended.

For unfinished/non-working projects, the expenditure incurred after 31 December 2023 is covered from the beneficiary’s own resources, i.e., in the case of the MoI from the state budget. The IROP Managing Authority accepted this procedure using the methodological recommendation of the National Coordination Authority for the closure of the programming period of 2014-2020, thus creating space for the beneficiary to fulfil the purpose of the project and complete the project in accordance with the terms of the subsidy. A similar approach was taken in the case of the eISIR (eJustice) project, which is referred to under the first barrier to digital transformation.

Errors in project management are usually reflected in ICT project tender procedures, leading to compromises that do not meet user needs and incur additional increased costs, including for the simultaneous operation of new and old information systems.

An example is the finding of Audit No 22/31: The Ministry of Finance was preparing an information system for supervision over gambling and committed fundamental errors already at the stage of the tender documentation. The documentation contained substantive and analytical deficiencies, which led the MoF to issue 15 correction notices during the tender procedure. The deadline for the submission of tenders was extended from 60 to 270 days. In the implementation phase, the project was terminated before the entire system was completed. The AISG was never fully operational to the extent intended, with only two of the three planned modules completed, although funds had been spent on the development of all three modules. The MoF thus spent part of the funds in an ineffective and uneconomical manner. The original SSBL system, which was to be replaced by the AISG system, continues to be used, incurs operating expenditure and does not meet the requirements of the executors of the agenda in question.

Shortcomings in the management of projects (including the risks associated therewith) were identified by the SAO in Audit No 24/26. The projects of the MoI and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) aimed to improve the state of information support in the performance of visa and other consular services, and their financial volume exceeds CZK 500 million. The situation has led the MoI and the MoFA to postpone the completion of the projects and thus prolong the operation of inadequate information support, thereby reducing the efficiency and economy of spending, as illustrated by the following two examples in the area of consular services.

In 2022, the MoFA purchased a new information system for travel documents for CZK 126.7 million. The system started its operation in October 2023. However, the MoFA did not terminate the operation of the old system and even concluded a new contract to secure its operation. The total annual operating expenditure on information support in this area thus increased 22-fold to CZK 25.9 million; this is due to the multiplied costs of supporting the old system and the current expenditure on the operation of the new system.

The MoI suspended the implementation of the Integrated Foreigners’ Agenda System (IFAS) project due to the lack of readiness of the legislative framework. The need to amend the Act on the Residence of Foreign Nationals, which is a necessary precondition for the functioning of the new information system, was identified as early as 2012. However, the draft amendment was not submitted by the MoI until eleven years later. The MoI was preparing a proposal for this legislative change in parallel with the preparation of the IFAS project. The delay of the project leads to the necessity to spend funds on a temporary solution for the implementation of the requirements arising from the EU Regulation on the Visa Information System.²³ The temporary solution consists in further development and modifications of the Information System for Foreigners (ISF).

(B5) COSTLY OPERATIONAL SOLUTIONS

The barrier involves technological, process and architectural constraints that increase costs.

The state administration continues operating information systems that are based on morally and technically outdated principles with disproportionately high costs of operation and necessary development. The SAO audits repeatedly show that, despite high investments in the operation and development of these systems, the performance of agendas is not being streamlined and the administrative burden is not being reduced. The purpose of these expenditures is only to keep a robust IS running and to ensure that official acts are carried out in accordance with the law. These “legacy information systems” are burdened by low levels of automation and lack of interoperability with other information systems.

A typical example at the Ministry of Finance is the monolithic and morally outdated Automated Tax Information System (ATIS) from the 1990s. The SAO already pointed out its problematic nature in terms of vendor lock-in in its Audit No 18/07 in connection with the introduction of the electronic register of sales (ERS), which had complicated the transition from the ATIS to the new information system. However, the Financial Administration of the Czech Republic (FA CR) has not yet succeeded in replacing the ATIS system, as another example from Audit No 23/23 shows. Although the introduction of new tools in the Income Tax Act led to a reduction in corporate income tax evasion and a more efficient tax administration, the General Financial Directorate (GFD) did not meet the strategic objective of developing the FA CR in terms of fully electronic records, as employees performed activities related to the transfer of files and records in paper form. By the time the audit was completed, the ATIS had not been replaced by a new information system that would allow the automated conversion of documents in paper form into electronic form with the legal effects of the original instruments.

Revenue from corporate income tax (CIT) is the fourth most important revenue of the state budget. In the context of the ATAD²⁴, five measures against corporate tax avoidance were introduced into national CIT legislation as of April 2019. In the context of the DAC6²⁵, automatic exchange of information on notified cross-border arrangements was introduced as of August 2020. The exchange of information was to contribute to the identification of new tax planning optimisation schemes and the adoption of timely and informed decisions by the Financial Administration of the CR to protect tax revenues, e.g., by identifying gaps in legislation and better targeting of audit procedures.

Efficient performance of agendas is unattainable in conjunction with the maintenance of morally and technologically obsolete monolithic information systems, as the situation in tax and pensions administration shows.

In Audit No 23/23, the SAO found that the implementation of the ATAD and DAC6 had not had a significant impact on the efficiency of the CIT administration. The processing of information from DAC6 notifications was in most cases carried out manually by the GFD. By the time the audit was completed, the ATIS had not been replaced by a new information system that would allow, inter alia, the automated transmission of information from DAC6 notifications to the locally competent tax authorities. Changes in legislation related to the implementation of the ATAD have not yet led to major changes in the processes and operations of CIT administration.

In addition to the ATIS, the Ministry of Finance has not resolved the method of transition of the Integrated Treasury Information System (ITIS) to the new technology platform, although the end of support for the current solution (SAP R/3)²⁶ in 2027 was announced by the provider. In Audit No 21/05, focused on expenditure related to the acquisition, operation and development of the ITIS, the SAO found that, given the scope, complexity and systemic importance of the ITIS, the MoF’s continued indecision was increasing the risk of time pressure, inefficient use of resources and threats to the operational reliability and security of the system. This is also linked to the usual knowledge superiority of the providers/contractors, which may force public administration contracting authorities to take steps that will lead to a less cost-effective solution within the lifecycle of such robust information systems.

Another example is Audit No 23/25, in which the SAO found that the pensions agendas were run by the CSSA on outdated technology using the COBOL programming language, which was used by an ever decreasing number of qualified experts. In addition, some key procedures are written in machine code that depends on a specific version of the operating system. Despite this, more than CZK 3.4 billion was spent on the operation and support of the system between 2018 and 2023. The government employees carrying out the agenda are forced to manually transcribe data from one part of the information system to another, and applicants for pension have to submit information already recorded by the State.

The digitalisation of the processing of state social support benefits represents a significant step towards modernising public administration, with the “Jenda” portal being a positive example. At the same time, however, the MoLSA’s procedure has shown that successful digitalisation of agendas cannot be implemented without thorough testing and without sufficient time for familiarisation with the new workflows on the part of the employees performing the given agenda.

The RILSA’s qualitative research published in December 2024 showed that the media image of the digitalisation of state social assistance benefits did not correspond with the experience and feelings of those who directly worked with the digitalisation elements on a daily basis.²⁷ The media and top representatives of the MoLSA reported on the successful implementation of digitalisation at the Labour Offices and expressed their satisfaction with the development. A massive increase in electronic communication between citizens and the Labour Office of the CR has occurred since July 2022, when the possibility of submitting a “simplified online application for housing allowance” was launched on the website of the MoLSA. A month later, on 1 August 2022, the online submission of simplified applications for parental allowance was launched under the same scheme. In August 2022, it also started to be possible to apply for a one-off child allowance of CZK 5,000 via the new “Jenda” web application or at Czech POINT contact points, and from October 2022 onwards also via the Czech Post. Simplified e-filing for a child benefit was launched in September 2022. The MoLSA and its subordinate Labour Offices enabled digital applications for state social assistance benefits over a single quarter, at a time of energy crisis and rapidly rising inflation, factors that significantly increased the number of applications made.

According to the results of the research, the employees of the Labour Office of the CR saw a problem in the way the digitalisation was being introduced, which was being done very quickly and without regard to the digital literacy of the clients and employees of the LO CR. In addition, neither staff nor clients were prepared for the digital submission of applications in advance – professional and targeted training for staff was lacking. Often, client submissions contained errors, which subsequently led to more time-consuming processing and required staff to have deeper IT skills than those which many of them actually had at the time. After the launch of electronic forms of client communication with the Labour Office, the employees rightfully expected that their daily, especially manual, activities would be reduced. However, the reality was the opposite.

Unless the internal digitalisation of offices is part of projects that allow full online submission via self-service client portals, digitalisation does not meet the efficiency aspect in relation to the funds spent.

The processing of online “applications for state social support benefits”, with attachments in different formats and sizes, was time-consuming for the employees. Just as applicants for benefits were learning how to use the new digital services, so were the employees of the LO CR learning how to work with them. This situation is very clearly illustrated by the statement of one of the research respondents (an employee of the LO CR): “I was like an IT specialist, I was always playing around with it [...] I wasn’t handling the actual benefits, I was just always shrinking, enlarging, then shrinking and uploading [...] I don’t have anything done, I’m just enlarging, shrinking, downloading [...] and converting photos from JPG to PDF. This isn’t my job, is it?”

The low level of system integration was also evident in the digitalisation of state social support benefits (see Audit No 23/25). The revealed shortcomings in the internal digitalisation of the Labour Office of the CR had a very negative impact on the efficiency of the spent resources, regardless of whether the cause lay in organisational and procedural reasons or legislative constraints. Although the application can be submitted online, the government employees must then manually transcribe the data between systems. In addition, the employees of the Labour Office have to manually search and check the personal data of applicants for parental allowance in a different IS because the different systems are not interconnected. Despite the digitalisation of agendas on the client communication side (“front-end”), the data is being converted back to paper form on the part of the authorities concerned (“back-end”).

Furthermore, the SAO described the creation of twelve similar information systems within the digital technical mapping system in Audit No 24/07. The establishment of these systems is based on Act No 200/1994 Coll., on Surveying and on Amendments and Supplements to Certain Acts Related to its Introduction, although the Act does not explicitly require a separate information system for each region. Nevertheless, twelve regional information systems that fulfil the same purpose and have similar functionalities have been created. According to the same Act, an interface had to be created to integrate these information systems of regional digital technical maps, as a separate information system administered by the COSMC.

(B6) INCOMPLETE DATA WITH COMPLEX DATA FLOWS

The barrier is related to non-sharing and poor quality of data or legal restrictions on the use of data.

An efficient functioning of digital public services depends, among other things, on high-quality, complete and real-time data that enables the interconnected performance of agendas and informed decision-making by their executors, without the need to obtain data from public administration clients where the public administration already possesses that data. The audited Public Administration Information Systems often do not fulfil the purpose for which they were set up. Data captured for recording and access purposes is often incomplete or not in the system at all. Instead of efficient information support, the authorities are replacing system functions with temporary solutions that use up internal staff capacity for further processing of spreadsheets and manual transcription of data.

For example, under Audit No 21/20, the functionality of the ESF IS was examined, the aim of which was, among other things, to enable the evaluation of the impact of the financial support provided. Although the system was technically capable of capturing data on supported entities, its quality and completeness were severely limited, especially in the initial period of operation. At the same time, it was found that the system did not contain all the mandatory data set out in the ESF Regulation, which significantly reduces its subsequent usability for evaluation.

In Audit No 22/31, the auditors pointed out the problem of an incomplete information system (AISG), which had been supposed to serve as a basic tool for the supervision over gambling operators. As a result of the failure to develop an IS with a comprehensive database, the competent public authorities in the area of gambling lacked the information necessary to ensure efficient supervision and the proper administration of gambling taxes. In no case did the data in the AISG match the data in the sample of 15 audited tax returns. Incomplete and unreliable data in the SSBL IS limited the effectiveness of the tax authorities’ audit activities, as the tax authorities had to verify the information from other sources. Although the AISG is by law supposed to contain gaming and financial data of gambling operators, in practice incomplete or incorrect information has been entered into it.

Audit No 23/11 found major shortcomings in the area of information support for the agenda of social and legal protection of children (SLPC). The MoLSA had not launched the information system to support the SLPC agenda as required by law (since 2013), thus preventing the competent authorities from fulfilling their obligations under the implementing decree. As a result, the ASLPC staff kept documentation outside the information system, mostly in paper or temporary digital forms. The transfer of files and records was physical, not electronic. The MoLSA subsequently replaced the planned IS with a temporary solution in the form of shared MS Excel spreadsheets, which had the effect of reducing the efficiency, clarity and security of data processing.

Shortcomings in data sharing were also found by the SAO during the audit of the Financial Administration of the CR in the area of tax revenue protection, as already mentioned in the subsection on barrier (B5) of Audit No 23/23, as the ATIS did not allow for automated transfer of relevant information to the locally competent tax authorities.

In Audit No 24/07, the SAO focused on digital technical maps of the regions, which had been intended to be a source of complete and reliable information on the transport and technical infrastructure of the regions (e.g., roads, water pipelines, sewers, gas pipelines, electricity and communication cables, etc.) and the location and placement of that infrastructure as of 1 July 2024. In terms of data quality, it was found that over 50% of infrastructure owners identified by the Czech Office for Surveying, Mapping and Cadastre had not entered the data required by law into the digital technical maps (DTM). Over 50% of the sites and facilities in the audited sample of technical infrastructure obtained in the Ústí Region had unknown or unsatisfactory position accuracy.

(B7) SHORTAGE OF EXPERT HUMAN RESOURCES

The barrier includes a lack of staffing and capacity to efficiently implement and operate digital services.

The performance of public administration in the field of ICT has long been limited by the insufficient availability of qualified human resources. Across the projects and actions audited, there is repeated evidence of low stability of staffing, high turnover and therefore difficulty in sustaining professional capacity. Among other things, the current pay scale system is not able to compete sufficiently with the private sector, especially in areas with high demand for IT specialists. Audit findings repeatedly pointed to a disproportion between the demands placed on public institutions and their actual staffing capacities.

Compensating for the lack of in-house experts by increasing the involvement of contractors in key roles in eGovernment projects is usually associated with a number of risks. These are manifested both in the area of digital service quality management and in other areas such as cybersecurity, as there is greater dependence on the supply chain.²⁸

The SAO’s findings in this area (barrier) are clearly in line with the Final Report on the ICT Spending Review published by the Ministry of Finance in 2024. In the Report, the MoF warns, among other things, that without a fundamental change in the approach to human resources management, no significant improvement in the performance of public administration in digitalisation projects can be expected. The Report recommends the introduction of more attractive career paths, a more efficient remuneration system and, in particular, centralised management of ICT functions in the state administration.²⁹

Up-to-date and robust data on the remuneration of government employees was provided by the updated analytical study Civil and public servants: where do they work and for how much ? in 2025.³⁰ The study showed, among other things, that although real average salaries (adjusted for inflation, i.e., in constant 2024 prices) had been rising for all categories of government employees since 2003, they had fallen significantly after 2020. For ministry employees, this trend started even before then, in 2019. Moreover, the current downturn is more pronounced than the one that followed the financial crisis between 2009 and 2012. An analysis of this situation has been refined by the follow-up study Comparing wages and salaries in the Czech Republic: a bigger problem than it seems .³¹ Among other things, the document states that real salaries of government employees stagnated (at ministries, other central authorities as well as non-central authorities) in 2024. However, real salaries at the ministries had fallen for the fifth year in a row. The salaries of ministerial officials have thus fallen to the level of the average salary in Prague – although there are more people with university degrees among the ministry employees than in the overall workforce in Prague.

Uncompetitive financial conditions contribute significantly to the lack of professional capacity in the state administration. This is a very serious problem for ICT and, in particular, for the development of eGovernment; the impact is reflected in the availability and quality of digital services. And it is not just about a worse user experience. In many cases, new digital services are not being created due to a lack of experts on the side of the State. In addition, eGovernment projects that have already been launched to enable citizens to deal with their life situations online and to make the work of the government employees carrying out the agenda more efficient are often significantly delayed.

According to the 2024 Civil Service Annual Report ³², 73,315 posts within civil service were systematised in 2024. Of these, 64,421 posts fall under the Civil Service Act and a total of CZK 33.9 billion has been allocated to these posts.

However, it is not possible to ascertain specific data on the number of government employees, especially those in the civil service scheme who specialise in the field of ICT in the state administration, from the information available in the relevant Annual Report. A modification of the Civil Service Information System in connection with the amendment to the Civil Service Act effective from 1 January 2025 should help to improve this situation. The most important innovation will be the linking of the Register of government employees and employees in offices and Registration of systematisation and organisational structure modules, which will enable more accurate registration of the occupancy of systematised posts.

In its Civil Service Annual Reports, the MoI also provides data on the number of government employees by individual branches of service. This is the number of government employees who are listed in the civil service register in a given branch of service (they have passed a specific part of the civil service examination in that branch of service or have been recognised as qualified for that branch of service) but may not be performing that branch of service. Information on how many government employees are registered in a systematised post where the government employees actually work, for example, the field of “ICT services”, i.e., occupied posts by field of service, is not monitored at the central level.

A typical example is the finding in Audit No 19/26, which the SAO closed in 2020. The audit points to the fact that the performance of key cybersecurity activities entrusted to the National Cyber and Information Security Agency (NCISA) and the MoI was significantly limited by a lack of professionally qualified human resources. Securing and stabilising these capacities is a major systemic barrier to the functioning of public administration, and its effects are most pronounced in areas with high demands on expert knowledge. The NCISA has faced a turnover rate of approximately 10% over a long period of time, which, in the context of an agency acting as a central coordinating body in the field of cybersecurity, poses a risk of loss or insufficient handover of the agenda between departing and newly hired staff. This situation may have a negative impact on the continuity of operational activities, the implementation of project plans and ensuring professional continuity.

Audit No 19/26 showed that the MoI had reported similar staff instability in professional positions in the field of information systems security. Some key roles repeatedly had to be outsourced. This approach persisted despite the fact that the MoI as a service office had the opportunity to use the institution of a “key service post” (pursuant to Act No 234/2014 Coll., on Civil Service), which serves precisely to increase expert capacities in critical areas of the state administration.

The state administration is building IT expert teams within individual eGovernment projects. These are usually financed with the help of EU subsidies. With the end of the projects, the continuity of these professionals is threatened or disappears, even though the digital transformation is not yet complete.

Similarly, Audit No 22/20 confirmed that the National eHealth Centre (NeHC) had not been “operational” at a key stage of the digitalisation of the health sector, and the lack of qualified experts led to the outsourcing of key project roles. The audit followed up on previous findings from Audit No 17/03 and emphasised that insufficient staffing of the NeHC had dramatically slowed down the implementation of eHealth services in the entire Czech health sector.

Maintaining an expertly functioning National eHealth Centre, whose operations have improved significantly since 2023 with the arrival of new leadership, will be a key challenge for the Ministry of Health once the suite of eHealth projects financed under the National Recovery Plan are completed. The SAO points out that the demands on the development and continuity of all elements of eHealth will be high even after 2026, when the remaining key components of eHealth will be launched and the requirements of Act No 325/2021 Coll., on the Digitalisation of the Health Sector, will be met.

FINANCING THE DIGITALISATION OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

The digitalisation of public administration is a financially demanding area in the long term. This section provides an overview of ICT spending from the state budget as well as from EU funds and financial instruments (especially through the IROP and the NRP). It is worth noting that part of the expenditure associated with information support for state administration agendas in a delegated capacity is also borne by local governments. They receive an annual contribution to partially cover the expenditure associated with the exercise of state administration,³³ i.e., for salary and operating expenditure related to employees who carry out state administration in a delegated capacity. In 2024, the total contribution was CZK 11.7 billion.

However, the following paragraphs of this section do not take account of this expenditure due to the fact that ICT expenditure is not distinguished by the MoI within the contribution.

GOVERNMENT SPENDING ON DIGITALISATION

State budget

In the period of 2020-2024, the organisational units of the State spent approximately CZK 102 billion on ICT. These funds include both capital expenditure and current operating expenditure to cover the costs of information support both at the level of the public administration agendas carried out and the provision of internal activities related to the day-to-day running of the relevant offices.

Chart 1: Expenditure of the state budget and state funds on ICT in the period of 2020-2024 (in CZK million)

Source: prepared by the SAO using data from the State Treasury Monitor, budget items 5042, 5162, 5168, 5172, 6111 and 6125.

Expenditure in this area is showing a steady growth trend, with an increase of more than 40% between 2020 and 2024. This development reflects the changing approach of the State to the fulfilment of ICT needs. There is a shift from the traditional model based on the purchase of hardware and software to a model that favours the outsourcing of services and the use of cloud solutions, which are still dominated by ministerial solutions instead of supra-ministerial ones.

The state budget expenditure on ICT amounted to approximately CZK 25 billion in 2024. Most of the funds went to these state budget chapters: the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs. These three chapters together account for about 50% of the total ICT expenditure of organisational units of the State and state funds. In the state budget chapter of the Ministry of the Interior, the total expenditure exceeded CZK 5.7 billion, while in the case of the relatively new chapter of the Digital and Information Agency, the expenditure amounted to less than CZK 2.6 billion.

Public contracts

A significant part of ICT expenditure is linked to the financing of public contracts. In the period of 2020-2023, a total of CZK 89.15 billion was spent on ICT contracts. The largest volume of these funds, amounting to 68.5%, fell under the organisational units of the State. After excluding framework agreements (FA) and dynamic purchasing systems (DPS), the volume of ICT contracts amounted to CZK 61.7 billion. Of that amount, approximately CZK 21.8 billion (35.4%) was spent on ICT consulting and services and CZK 13.9 billion (22.5%) on telecommunications and Internet services.

In the last two years, there has been a slight increase in the share of other types of contracting authorities, which may also reflect the higher level of ICT usage by public sector organisations. In contrast, the volume of expenditure in contracts related to physical supplies, such as computers and technology or equipment repairs, has a significantly lower share. The State’s expenditure is thus mainly directed towards services and operational support.

Part of the expenditure is also spent outside public procurement in the framework of vertical or horizontal cooperation with state-owned enterprises³⁴ whose exclusive or predominant portfolio of activities is directed towards services and supplies for the benefit of the State or related parties. For example, in 2023, the state-owned enterprise NACIT carried out transactions with related parties that generated total revenues of almost CZK 2.1 billion. The overwhelming majority of them was attributed to the Ministry of the Interior as the main purchaser of the ICT services provided. Significant revenues were also generated from the Digital and Information Agency, the Ministry of Health and other organisational units of the State that used the services of that enterprise, particularly in the area of eGovernment. In the case of the state-owned enterprise STSSC, transactions with related parties exceeded CZK 660 million. The Ministry of Finance has been a key customer since the enterprise’s inception. The STSSC provides and operates the Integrated Treasury Information System , including secure data centre services. A significant part of the services is also represented by shared infrastructure and dedicated hosting services, which the MoF uses mainly for the agenda systems³⁵ but also for operational information systems. In the case of the state-owned enterprise CENDIS, revenues from its core business reached almost CZK 550 million in 2023. The most significant transactions were related to the electronic vignette project and the One Ticket project.³⁶

USE OF EU FUNDS

The EU budget plays an important role in financing projects related to digitalisation in public administration. In the period under review, approximately CZK 26 billion was spent on ICT projects, mainly from the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) and the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF). Thus, the Integrated Regional Operational Programme (2014-2020)³⁷ and the National Recovery Plan have been profiled as the most important for investment in the development of eGovernment.

This section focuses on calls exclusively targeting ICT projects related to digitalisation. In addition to state administration and ministry projects, eHealth projects implemented by hospitals and hospital facilities also form a significant part.

IROP 2014-2020

In the programming period of 2014-2020, the Integrated Regional Operational Programme was allocated approximately CZK 163 billion from European funds. ICT projects fall under the IROP Specific Objective 3.2 Increasing the efficiency and transparency of public administration through the development of the use and quality of ICT systems ³⁸. CZK 8.07 billion was allocated for these projects under the IROP.³⁹

The SAO’s review focused on projects that clearly showed that they were primarily intended for the ICT sector.⁴⁰ In the period of 2014-2020, a total of CZK 4.7 billion was allocated to 60 projects under the IROP. Most projects were implemented by hospitals (20), other state administration authorities (16) and ministries (15). The highest volume of funds of CZK 1.8 billion was allocated to hospitals and hospital facilities under calls No 10 and No 26, intended, among other things, for the development of eHealth and cybersecurity. The ministries drew CZK 1.6 billion from calls Nos 10, 17, 23 and 26. Almost one-half of the funds allocated to the ministries fell under call No 23, which focused on specific information and communication systems and infrastructure. The largest amount of funds was allocated to the project of the Ministry of the Interior entitled Electronic Collection of Laws and International Treaties (eCollection) and Electronic Legislation (eLegislation). In the case of other state administration authorities, the largest allocations were made by the COSMC (30 %), the DIA (18 %) and the NCISA (15 %).

IROP 2021-2027

In the programming period of 2021-2027, the IROP has been allocated CZK 117 billion from European funds. An amount of CZK 12.4 billion is allocated for eGovernment and cybersecurity in Specific Objective 1.1.

The SAO identified 65 projects that focused on ICT.⁴¹ The highest number of projects is reported by hospitals and hospital facilities (34), ministries (11) and state contributory organisations (11). The largest amount of funds, amounting to CZK 2.3 billion, has been allocated to ministries for projects under calls No 5 and No 11 focused on cybersecurity and the digitalisation of public administration services. The highest total eligible expenditure (TEE) of all ICT projects of the Integrated Regional Operational Programme 2021-2027 was reported by the project of the Ministry of Justice Digitalisation of the court agendas eCriminalProcedure, eAdministration and ePaymentOrder with the amount of CZK 420 million. CZK 926 million was allocated to hospitals in nine calls for projects.

National Recovery Plan

The NRP is structured into seven main pillars. One of these is the Digital Transformation pillar, which has the ambition of creating and developing a digital ecosystem to support the introduction of new and emerging technologies into the economy.

For the purposes of this Comprehensive Report, the SAO focused on projects that fell under the five components of the Digital Transformation pillar. It also included Component 4.4 Improving the efficiency of public administration , which is part of the pillar Institutions and regulation and support of business in response to COVID-19 (as structured in the National Recovery Plan ).

In terms of the number of projects implemented, applicants in the categories of other state administration authorities (69), ministries (62) and hospitals and hospital facilities (34) dominate. A total of CZK 16.7 billion (85% of the total value of the TEE of selected projects) was allocated to ministries and other state administration authorities, with more than a half of these funds going to the ministries. The ministries also report the highest average value per project compared to other types of applicants. Of the selected projects, the highest TEE (CZK 730 million) is reported by the MoI project Development of the network of terminal warning and information elements in the conditions of the Fire Rescue Service of the CR . Although only three projects are being implemented by state funds and state-owned enterprises, they report high TEE.⁴²

CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES IN THE DIGITAL TRANSFORMATION OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

Over the five-year period (2020-2024), the Czech Republic has undergone significant leaps in legislative and institutional changes that have fundamentally affected the shape of eGovernment and the way the State serves its clients. Symbols of the period are the strengthening of the legal anchoring of digital services, progress in building key digital infrastructure and efforts to better coordinate the digitalisation of public administration, but also a number of unfulfilled ambitions in major eGovernment projects the main drivers of which were the ministries.

Czech eGovernment will continue facing challenges in the years to come – from the limited effectiveness of fragmented solutions to the low usability of services and problems in their implementation, where the readiness of digitally friendly legislation is underestimated.⁴³ Research conducted in 2025 on the digitalisation of the Czech Republic within the Services.Digital project has produced a number of positive findings that confirm the interest of citizens and companies in online communication with the State.⁴⁴ However, it has turned out that a significant share of citizens and companies are not satisfied with the digital services of the State, and the project report in this context points, among other things, to the lack of management of the quality of digital services. It is necessary to set up such management as a unified framework for measuring the quality of efficiency, satisfaction and quality with a link to the role of a specific product owner ⁴⁵ of a given eGovernment service. Digital service quality management requires, above all, the continuous collection of data on the performance of the relevant agendas.⁴⁶

The common denominator is the high financial complexity of ICT solutions, where additional costs are often justified by unpredictable changes in requirements without demonstrable benefits for key agendas and their stakeholders.

The high cost of digitalising public administration services raises questions about the sustainability of public spending, as there is no better way to manage the cost-benefit ratio. Conditions that go beyond the IT projects themselves will also be crucial for the success of digitalisation, in particular the quality and availability of data through the “linked data pool”⁴⁷, the digital competencies of public administration staff and the reliable provision of cybersecurity. Public trust in the State’s handling of data securely and responsibly is a general factor in citizens’ willingness to adopt and actively use digital government services.

The Supreme Audit Office will continue playing the role of an independent evaluator of the economy, efficiency and effectiveness of spending public funds in the area of eGovernment and ICT in public administration in general. Based on the results of its audit and analytical activities, the SAO identified systemic causes of the shortcomings and pointed out the risks of pseudo-digitalisation. Successful management of these risks can turn digital transformation into real benefits for public administration clients (citizens and business entities) and the public administration itself, and thus improve the conditions for increasing the competitiveness of the Czech Republic.

Many countries that are leaders in the development of eGovernment place emphasis on the so-called proactive approach of the State. This is a model in which digital public administration services transmit data to each other in an automated way to identify the citizen’s life situation and actively offer him/her a relevant service to use. In the Czech environment, however, the model in which the citizen has to initiate an action (make a submission) and undergo complex processes in which he/she submits data that the public authorities cannot or do not know how to transfer automatically still prevails. The existing view that delaying the roll-out of proactive digital services saves public funds is not matched by foreign experience.

In the final section of the present Report, the SAO therefore identifies three key factors that will shape the efficiency of the digital transformation of the state administration in the coming years.

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE – PUTTING IT INTO PRACTICE

Artificial intelligence (AI) is now a major digital policy priority, both at the European Union level and in individual Member States. The Czech Republic was one of the first EU countries to adopt its own National Artificial Intelligence Strategy of the Czech Republic in 2019. At the European level, the “Artificial Intelligence Act” [Regulation (EU) 2024/1689], the first comprehensive legal framework for AI regulation, was adopted in 2024. The Czech Republic subsequently followed up with an updated version of its strategy under the name National Artificial Intelligence Strategy of the Czech Republic 2030 (NAIS)⁴⁸.

AI brings a wide range of opportunities from automating routine activities to more efficient data management and better-targeted delivery of public services. The NAIS shows that the Czech Republic is still at the beginning of identifying areas of public administration with the potential to implement AI. Funding is mainly directed towards research, strategic documents and support for the innovation environment, not towards concrete solutions with a direct impact on citizens.

The Government AI Readiness Index , published by Oxford Insights, compares the readiness of 188 countries to implement AI each year. The index tracks 40 indicators across three pillars: government, technology sector and data and infrastructure. In the 2024 ranking, the Czech Republic ranked 31st globally and 18th among European countries.⁴⁹ The evaluation shows that the Czech Republic excels in data availability and has a clearly defined Government strategy for artificial intelligence. However, there is still a lag in the development of the technology sector and in increasing the digital capacity of the state administration, which still lags behind the strategic ambitions.

Unlike the Czech Republic, which does not cite specific projects or pilot activities in its NAIS strategy, referring to its action plan⁵⁰, some countries have a more pragmatic approach to strategic AI management, building on concrete examples of AI use. In its 2019 strategy, Denmark, for example, builds directly on existing IT projects and describes specifically how each initiative will be further developed. The document presents case studies across sectors and defines new targeted activities based on them.⁵¹ For example, in its first AI strategy of 2018 (PNRIA), France introduced the Health Data Hub project, which aims to connect health data to develop AI models in the health sector. The strategy also emphasises support for language technologies and the research infrastructure⁵². The 2024 strategy document OUR AI: OUR AMBITION FOR FRANCE contains a number of specific recommendations for the implementation and management of AI, such as creating the conditions for the establishment of data centres in France, setting up an investment fund to support start-ups or introducing an “AI exemption” for research institutions.⁵³ Estonia is developing a centralised virtual assistant concept, Bürokratt , which focuses on life situations and allows citizens to communicate with the State in their natural language around the clock.

The common denominator of these approaches is that the strategies are not merely based on general principles and visions, but directly define follow-up or new solutions and describe their expected benefits.

One of the main challenges in the Czech Republic remains the coordination of AI implementation within projects and activities related to the digital transformation of state administration. In addition to the already existing responsibilities of the MoI and the DIA (see the section Digitalisation in the Czech Republic... for more details), the Ministry of Industry and Trade has also entered this area and has set up an institutional framework for cooperation within the NAIS, which includes representation of the individual agenda managers in the established AI Committee. Thus, the risk is still a complex management structure with unclear division of responsibilities for results, which at the same time weakens the achievement of synergies in investments in the development of eGovernment.

PERSONNEL CAPACITY – CREATING A STABLE CORE OF IT EXPERTS ON THE PART OF THE STATE

The current pace of the digital transformation of state administration is facing a structural problem in the form of a lack of qualified ICT staff, which is manifested in high turnover, undersized teams and loss of continuity and know-how. As a result, the ministries often do not have a stable core of experts to manage and develop key digital projects and their funding is temporally limited to EU funds or other EU financial instruments.

The review of ICT spending conducted by the Ministry of Finance in 2025 confirms that the state administration is unable to offer competitive salary conditions compared to the private sector, which is negatively reflected in the lack of cybersecurity specialists, programmers, system administrators, data analysts and solution and enterprise architects on the side of the State. This situation strengthens the dependence on external contractors and weakens the State’s ability to maintain control over the development and quality of digital services.⁵⁴

The experience of countries such as Sweden and Luxembourg shows that a long-term, strategy-driven approach yields better results for ICT specialists; such approach involves integrating digital skills into the education system, linking the public and private sectors, promoting lifelong learning and creating an attractive working environment.⁵⁵ In comparison, the Czech Republic continues to have a rather weak systemic support for technical education, low competitiveness in remuneration, and a lack of coherent career paths for ICT experts in public administration.

Measures to address the lack of ICT professionals on the side of the State must therefore be seen as crucial for a successful digital transformation.

TECHNOLOGICAL PURITY AND SHARED SERVICES – REDUCING THE FRAGMENTATION OF IT SOLUTIONS

The public administration provides a wide range of services, which are now supported by a large number of diverse information systems. Due to the lack of standardisation, individual public administration authorities have often purchased their own technical solutions, which are then difficult to integrate into the existing environment and do not benefit from the synergies that arise from the offer of existing shared services. This increases the complexity of the solutions and the associated demands on human resources, which is further reflected in the increasing costs of operation and maintenance of departmental ICT infrastructure and monolithic Public Administration Information Systems, which are often morally obsolete and the renewal of their HW and SW platforms cannot bring the desired streamlining.

Technological fragmentation is also linked to different concepts within the delegated agendas – the region, municipality or ministry often deal with them differently and therefore in different systems. A typical example is digital technical maps, where, instead of one solution, twelve regional systems were created, often with only partial sharing of the infrastructure and without the savings that would have been achieved from a unified solution. Fragmentation of IT solutions within one agenda leads to absurd situations, where, for example, the State provides financial support for the implementation of AI to individual building authorities⁵⁶, instead of creating an integrated solution that would be used by all public authorities in the field of the building proceedings agenda. Another example is the agenda of social and legal protection of children, in which operations are executed using individually acquired and run information systems of individual municipalities with extended powers.

Although the DIA (the Office of the Chief eGovernment Architect) has been assessing projects for compliance with the principles of the Information Concept of the CR and other standards since the beginning, it has not been able, given its powers, to prevent the financing of projects that do not meet the technological purity and are contrary to these principles. These undesirable changes are often adopted during project implementation outside the decision-making influence of the DIA.

An integral part of eGovernment is also the area of the records management, where the situation is also unsatisfactory. Currently, there are hundreds of instances of the records management services with different versions and specifics from a narrow range of providers within the state administration.

The state administration (but also the public administration as a whole) applied the undesirable principle of “each in its own way” in the digital transformation. This was reflected, among other things, in the high costs of ensuring interoperability between the information systems in operation. Ensuring “value for money” within the eGovernment infrastructure lifecycle and reducing the fragmentation of IT solutions across the state administration and its agendas are essential preconditions for achieving control over the ever-increasing ICT expenditures.

Therefore, for a financially sustainable eGovernment, there is a need to discuss a change of approach to its development. This should consist in the separation of the substantive responsibility (the authorities responsible for individual agendas) from the responsibility for defining an optimal ICT solution which includes a proposal of budgets for relevant IT projects. The DIA’s activities would then gradually shift to designing technology and application solutions across agenda services. Given the limited resources of the DIA, there is a need to define priorities in relation to key eGovernment services.

Continued digitalisation of public administration services must respect the conditions for an efficient use of shared eGovernment infrastructure. The DIA manages that infrastructure and therefore needs to have information for capacity planning in order to prevent outages of eGovernment services.

This approach would require the DIA to function as a permanent eGovernment competence centre independent of the project funding which was used to secure the necessary human resources.⁵⁷ Successfully reducing the fragmentation of information support for public administration agendas cannot be achieved without strengthening accountability for adherence to ICT project budgets. The previous programming period (2014-2020) showed that the Managing Authority was only right to follow the line of use of EU funds. The increase in expenditure from the state budget within the framework of frequent changes to co-financed eGovernment projects does not undergo any oppositional assessment in terms of the efficiency and effectiveness of the funds spent.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Act on the Right to Digital Services: Act No 12/2020 Coll., on the Right to Digital Services and on Amendments to Certain Acts

AI: artificial intelligence
AISG: Agenda Information System for Gambling
ASLPC: Authority for Social and Legal Protection of Children
ATAD: Council Directive (EU) 2016/1164 of 12 July 2016 laying down rules against tax avoidance practices that directly affect the functioning of the internal market
ATIS: Automated Tax Information System
BR: basic registries
BR 2.0 Concept: Basic Registries 2.0 – Target Concept (basic registries transformation plan dated 2018)
BR IS: Basic Registries Information System
BRA: Basic Registries Authority
CIT: corporate income tax
COSMC: Czech Office for Surveying, Mapping and Cadastre
CR: Czech Republic
CSSA: Czech Social Security Administration
DAC6: Council Directive (EU) 2018/822 of 25 May 2018 amending Directive 2011/16/EU as regards mandatory automatic exchange of information in the field of taxation in relation to reportable cross-border arrangements
DESI: Digital Economy and Society Index
DIA: Digital and Information Agency
DPS: dynamic purchasing systems
DTM: digital technical maps
ECA: European Court of Auditors
eCeL: Electronic Collection of Laws and International Treaties (eCollection) and Electronic Legislation (eLegislation)
eGovernment: electronic public administration services
eISIR: electronic information system of the Insolvency Register
ERDF: European Regional Development Fund
ESF: European Social Fund
ESF IS: European Social Fund information system
EU: European Union
EV IS: Electronic Vignette Information System
FA: framework agreements
FA CR: Financial Administration of the Czech Republic
GFD: General Financial Directorate
HW: hardware
ICT: information and communication technology
IFAS: Integrated Foreigners’ Agenda System
IHIS: Institute of Health Information and Statistics of the Czech Republic
IROP: Integrated Regional Operational Programme
IS: information system
ISF: Information System for Foreigners
IT: information technology
ITIS: Integrated Treasury Information System (State Treasury)
LO CR: Labour Office of the Czech Republic
MoF: Ministry of Finance
MoFA: Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MoH: Ministry of Health
MoI: Ministry of the Interior
MoJ: Ministry of Justice
MoLSA: Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs
MoT: Ministry of Transport
NACIT: National Agency for Communication and Information Technologies
NAIS: National Artificial Intelligence Strategy of the Czech Republic 2030
NCISA: National Cyber and Information Security Agency
: National eHealth Centre
NRP: National Recovery Plan
OT: One Ticket
PMA: process modelling of agendas
RRF: Recovery and Resilience Facility
SAO: Supreme Audit Office
SLPC: social and legal protection of children
SSBL: information system of the State Supervision over Betting and Lotteries
STSSC: State Treasury Shared Services Centre, state enterprise
SW: software
TEE: total eligible expenditure

1 As a result of the real state of eGovernment, the deadline for the implementation of the Act was postponed until February 2027 on the basis of a parliamentary amendment (No 5648) to the Government Bill amending Act No 127/2005 Coll., on Electronic Communications and on Amendments to Certain Related Acts (Parliamentary Document No 774).

2 The status corresponds to the information in the DIA’s open data in the National Open Data Catalogue, which was withdrawn on 3 February 2025.

3 The authority responsible for an agenda under Czech law is a public authority (typically a central administrative authority – for example, a ministry or other authority with national competence), which has the agenda in its competence and makes a notification of that agenda under Act No 111/2009 Coll., on Basic Registers.

4 Bankovní identita, a.s. is an aggregator of all Banking Identities (Bank iD) in the Czech Republic.

5 This does not yet apply to brand new licence holders, i.e., those who have only recently passed their driving test.

6 The Single Point of Access is available at https://europa.eu/youreurope/index.htm#cs.

7 The templates are published in the online Catalogue of Representation Authority Types. Available online here.

8 EUROSAI IT Working Group seminar organised by the Supreme Audit Institutions of Estonia and the Czech Republic, held in Prague on 23-24 September 2025.

9 Section 12(3) of Act No 2/1969 Coll., on the Establishment of Ministries and Other Central State Administration Authorities of the Czech Republic.

10 Government Resolution No 393 of 28 May 2025 on the creation of the post and appointment of the Government Commissioner for Artificial Intelligence

11 Public Administration Portal, offer of online public administration services – gov.cz.

12 The fact that some audits did not identify significant barriers in the field of ICT does not necessarily imply the absence of such barriers. In many of these audits, the examination of the effectiveness, economy and efficiency of ICT expenditure was part of a broader focus on the management of State property and funds, and the level of detail was thus different from audit operations focused exclusively on ICT in terms of eGovernment or the streamlining of the performance of individual agendas.

13 Performance audits focus on the economy, efficiency and effectiveness of the use of funds.

14 A business analysis is a systematic process that first describes and understands how a company or office operates today, and then proposes changes so that the digital solution actually supports the organisation’s goals (not just “wraps” the existing chaos in technology). In practice, this means that processes, roles, data and user needs are mapped, changes are prioritised, and a comprehensible set of requirements for new or modified IT systems is created. The result of a good business analysis is a clearly justified proposal of what to digitalise and why, what benefits are expected and how to know if they have been achieved.

15 Another indicator is the number of planned activities, of which only eight out of 37 were completed.

16 For example, improving the technical equipment of courts with IT resources, the use of digital recording and videoconferencing equipment.

17 Government Resolution No 169 of 12 March 2025 approved an increase in the expenditures of the MoJ chapter by CZK 1.5 billion to cover the programme Development and renewal of the material and technical base of the judiciary from 2023, which has been extended until 2030 and which includes, among other things, the sub-programme Acquisition and renewal of ICT

18 Special Report 13/2025: Support from the Recovery and Resilience Facility for the digital transition in EU Member States – A missed opportunity for strategic focus in addressing digital needs. Online source: https://www.eca.europa.eu/cs/publications/sr–2025-13.

19Digital Czechia programme (a pillar of the Information Concept of the CR), Strategic Framework for the Development of Public Administration in the CR for the period of 2014-2020, Client-Oriented Public Administration 2030.

20 The AS-IS and TO-BE analysis is the basis of the process improvement methodology in organisations. AS-IS, or, “as is” – i.e., a description of the current state of processes. The aim is to map in detail how processes currently work, including roles, data flows, technologies and bottlenecks. TO-BE, or, “as it should be” – i.e., a design of the target state after optimisation. This reflects the strategic goals of an organisation, the needs of users and the possibilities of digitalisation.

21 The PMA 3 project was a continuation of the PMA 1 and PMA 2 projects, which had been implemented by the MoI between 2009 and 2017 using EU Structural Funds.

22 As part of a package of measures to consolidate public budgets, an amendment to the Administrative Fees Act was adopted, which abolished the payment by stamps as of 31 December 2024 (Act No 349/2023 Coll., amending certain acts in connection with the consolidation of public budgets, amended the payment of administrative fees as of 1 January 2024 by deleting the possibility of payment by stamps from Section 6(8) of Act No 634/2004 Coll., on Administrative Fees, and at the same time provided in Article LXVII for a transitional period for the use of stamps until the end of 2024).

23 Regulation (EU) 2021/1133 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 July 2021 amending Regulations (EU) No 603/2013, (EU) 2016/794, (EU) 2018/1862, (EU) 2019/816 and (EU) 2019/818 as regards the establishment of the conditions for accessing other EU information systems for the purposes of the Visa Information System; Regulation (EU) 2021/1134 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 July 2021 amending Regulations (EC) No 767/2008, (EC) No 810/2009, (EU) 2016/399, (EU) 2017/2226, (EU) 2018/1240, (EU) 2018/1860, (EU) 2018/1861, (EU) 2019/817 and (EU) 2019/1896 of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council Decisions 2004/512/EC and 2008/633/JHA, for the purpose of reforming the Visa Information System.

24 Council Directive (EU) 2016/1164 of 12 July 2016 laying down rules against tax avoidance practices that directly affect the functioning of the internal market; the Directive was amended in 2017 by Council Directive (EU) 2017/952 of 29 May 2017 amending Directive (EU) 2016/1164 as regards hybrid mismatches with third countries (hereinafter referred to as the “ATAD”).

25 Council Directive (EU) 2018/822 of 25 May 2018 amending Directive 2011/16/EU as regards mandatory automatic exchange of information in the field of taxation in relation to reportable cross-border arrangements (hereinafter referred to as the “DAC6”).

26 While it is possible to get extended support until 2030, a significant increase in the price of that support can be expected.

27 The results of research by the team of the Research Institute for Labour and Social Affairs, published in the article (Dis)satisfaction of Labour Office staff with the digitalisation of state social supportbenefits in the journal Social Policy Forum No 4/2024, ISSN 1803-7488 – electronic version.

28 Foresight Cybersecurity Threats for 2030 – UPDATE (3/2024). ENISA. Available at: https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/foresight-cybersecurity-threats-for-2030-update-2024-extended-report.

29 Final Report on the ICT Spending Review. MoF (2024). Available at: https://mf.gov.cz/cs/kontrola-a-regulace/rizeni-a-kontrola-verejnych-financi/revize-vydaju/vysledky-cinnosti-revize-vydaju/2025/revize-vydaju-v-oblasti-ict-58805

30 The author is the IDEA think-tank at the Economics Institute of the Czech Academy of Sciences. The study offers detailed analytical insights into the structure and long-term trends in the number of state employees, their salaries and the related expenditure. The application is publicly available at: https://ideaapps.cerge-ei.cz/zamestnancistatu.

31 The study is available at https://idea.cerge-ei.cz/zpravy/srovnani-platu-a-mezd-v-ceske-republice.

32 Civil Service Annual Reports are issued by the MoI. Available online here.

33 The MoI coordinates the performance of state administration delegated to territorial self-governing units. In this role, it is responsible for the preparation of the state budget documents for the part dedicated to contributions to municipalities, regions and the City of Prague. Municipalities receive a contribution from the state budget for the performance of tasks in a delegated capacity (Section 62 of Act No 128/2000 Coll., on Municipalities).

34 National Agency for Communication and Information Technologies (NACIT), of which the MoI is the founder; the State Treasury Shared Services Centre, state enterprise (STSSC), founded by the MoF; CENDIS, an enterprise founded by the MoT and providing services to the Ministry of Transport as the Centre for Transport Information Systems.

35 For example, the Automated Tax Information System (ATIS), the Access to Registers of Economic Entities (AREE), the Agenda Information System for Gambling (AISG).

36 CENDIS has built and operates the One Ticket (OT) system for the Ministry of Transport as a central IT solution for the state-established national rail transport tariff in the Czech Republic. OT allows one to travel on a single ticket on trains of several participating carriers, especially on trains ordered by the State and the regions under their public service commitment.

37 The financial allocation of the IROP in the programming period of 2014-2020 amounted to EUR 5.4 billion and was geographically directed to 13 regions of the Czech Republic, i.e., excluding the City of Prague. The exception was eGovernment provided by ministries and other central administrative authorities with regard to the nationwide impact. In 2022, the sixth revision of the IROP programming document was approved with an increase of the programme allocation by the second REACT-EU tranche for 2022 in the amount of approx. EUR 313 million.

38 The abbreviation “ICT” in this case means “information and communication technology”.

39 Source: Ministry of Regional Development. Information on the IROP 2014-2020.

40 From the IROP programme, only projects that had been financially implemented or physically completed as of 10 June 2025 were included in the review. ICT projects from six calls were included in the dataset.

41 The dataset included not only implemented and physically or financially completed projects, but also projects that were in the stage of an approved support application or support application in progress.

42 The projects are focused on state cloud, DTM and a secure development of the digital state administration system.

43 See the section Main barriers to digital transformation of public administration; Legal, contractual and procedural constraints.

44 Digital state at half throttle (Digitální stát na půl plynu); ČESKO.DIGITAL and STEM, October 2025. Available online here.

45 The product owner must be an employee of a public institution, know the needs of the service users based on feedback, and set development priorities so that the digital service (product) really brings value to citizens and companies. The owner usually has the authority to make operational decisions to improve the service without lengthy bureaucracy.

46 The DIA has started to extract transaction data from the digitalised services under the project being completed under the NRP: Creation of a central data infrastructure for data handling, CZ.31.5.0/0.0/0.0/24_130/0010992.

47 The agenda manager for the performance of other agendas by other offices and authorities describes the data within his/her agenda and publishes that information in the relevant catalogue of the Shared Services Information System (egsbkatalog.cms2.cz), thus creating conditions for the transfer of data between the individual Public Administration Information Systems.

48 Ministry of Industry and Trade (2025): National Artificial Intelligence Strategy of the Czech Republic 2030. Available online here.

49 Oxford Insights (2024): Government AI Readiness Index. Available online here.

50 The action plan is part of the Implementation Plan of the Digital Czechia programme.

51 The Danish Government (2019): The Danish National Strategy for Artificial Intelligence. DigiSt – Agency for Digital Government, Copenhagen. Available online here.

52 The French National Artificial Intelligence Research Programme (2018): Artificial Intelligence for Humanity: The French AI Strategy. Available online here.

53 The French Artificial Intelligence Commission: OUR AI: OUR AMBITION FOR FRANCE. 2024. Available online here.

54 MoF CR. Final Report on the ICT Spending Review. 2024. Available online here.

55 In the DESI 2025, Sweden and Luxembourg were the best performers in the ICT specialist metric. Their national strategies, available on the EU Digital Skills & Jobs platform, show that this success has been underpinned by long-term strategic measures.

56 In October 2025, the Ministry of Regional Development, as the owner of the relevant component of the National Recovery Plan, announced the fourth call for the sub-component 1.6.4 – Further development of the digitalisation of building proceedings by supporting artificial intelligence at building authorities “AI for building authorities”. The call was addressed to municipal authorities of municipalities with extended powers, municipal authorities of municipalities, municipal authorities exercising the powers of the building authority, city halls or municipal authorities of city districts in the case of statutory cities, if they exercise the powers of the building authority, and regional authorities.

57 E.g., National Recovery Plan, component 1.7 Digital transformation of public administration.

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The Second Comprehensive Report on the Digitalisation of Public Administration in the Czech Republic (HTML version)

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